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As social scientists debating the right of return we are often confronted with conflicting legal, 
political and normative interpretations. This depends on the definition of the ‘right of return’ 
itself which involves in our view not only the right of mobility/movement (i.e. someone’s 
right to move to their pre-conflict village or city) but also three other necessary components: 
a) the right of restitution for property including financial support for the loss of income and 
for the reconstruction of destroyed properties; b) the transferability of those rights to one’s 
family and c) individual and communal rights which might include non-discrimination, 
electoral rights and participation in local decision-making processes as well as representation 
in policing and security mechanisms (and in cases of vulnerable groups positive 
discrimination such as preferential employment).  
Each of these elements is necessary for the restoration of a multicultural community 
but unfortunately there is no comprehensive legal framework that includes all three not to 
mention credible enforcement mechanisms. There is also key differentiation between 
international and EU/Council of Europe decisions. Within the EU legal system, Greek 
Cypriots often cite the right of movement and acquisition of property to justify the right of 
return for Greek Cypriots under future Turkish Cypriot administration. While the right of 
mobility for European citizens de facto resolves many of the displacement disputes among 
EU members (e.g. post-WWII Germans fleeing Poland), it has two major weaknesses; it 
lacks all other aforementioned elements that constitute the right of return and second it 
downgrades IDPs and refugees to the level of migrants/citizens of third states. EU’s mobility 
rights have been at times restricted giving opponents of the right of return arguments to 
oppose the much more solid normative and legal claims by IDPs and refugees.   
As to our fundamental question, does the right of return exist in international law? 
Our own interpretation is that international law is in the process of integrating the right of 
return but as of today this right has not yet been secured in relevant international legal 
provisions, practices, and norms. Our interpretation does not aim to challenge the legitimacy 
of the right of return or to disempower refugees and IDPs but rather to provide the necessary 
warnings against the use of ‘weak’ legal or political arguments; the additional danger with 
some of those is raising expectations that international law cannot satisfy at the moment. At 
the same time, the struggle of IDPs and refugees to secure their rights does not end by simply 
stating the boundaries of the current international legal system. On the contrary, one of the 
key purposes of the book is to initiate a discussion in relevant international fora aiming for 
the full incorporation of the right of return in international law.     
What is the present state of affairs? The UN’s own Pinheiro principles on housing and 
property reinsitution comes close to be integrating the right of return in international legal 
practices. The Principles include detailed provisions on the rights of disposssed owners 
emphasizing in particular their right to have their properties restituted, if they so wish and 
without stipulating any time limitations. Pinheiro however proposes non-binding principles 
(soft law) which are up to the discretion of individual member states to accept or reject. The 
Principles also fail to include the need for electoral decision-making mechanisms (a key 
finding of this book from Bosnia) and the role of community rights and organizations; they 
require though adequate consultation and participation of displaced persons in decision-
making (principle 14) during the process of return.1 
                                                 
1 http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/99774.pdf 
 Human rights advocates emphasize the centrality of justice mechanisms and argue 
for the application of widely acknowledged standards on refugees as documented in 
resolutions of international organizations such as the UN (Leckie, 2003: 12).2 Leckie cites 
two relevant types of UN resolutions: a) binding ones voted by the Security Council and b) 
non-binding from the General Assembly. Security Council resolutions emphasize the right of 
return in the former Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Georgia, (Abkhazia), Croatia, Iraq (Kuwait) and 
Cyprus while General Assembly resolutions focus on Palestine/Israel. Specifically, on 
Cyprus SC RES. 361, Aug. 30, 1974 calls on parties to “permit persons who wish to do so to 
return to their homes” (Leckie, 2003: 12). Critics might argue that in Cyprus the conditions 
40 days after the Turkish invasion are different from now after fifty or so years. ECHR 
decisions have pointed to this direction already with decisions restricting property restitution 
to second generation IDPs (Skoutakis, 2010).  
Countering this point, Barkan argues that no matter how long the injustice occurred, 
its legitimization or failure to defend them in the case of IDPs only encourages other 
wrongdoings (Barkan, 2000: xxxiii).  Another concern is that the right of return cannot be 
established without family reunification and community rebuilding. As this book, 
demonstrates IDPs and refugees will not return unless there is significant community 
involvement and mobilization for return. Likewise, the right of return could be interpreted as 
covering descendants and non-IDP partners. In many occasions, IDPs might not have been 
displaced directly at the time of the conflict (some might have left earlier for financial 
reasons but found the right of return to an ancestral land restricted as a result of a conflict)/    
A key challenge for human rights activists is that the right of return is not universally 
defined or even welcomed in legal or political terms. AN often unchallenged view is that 
protracted refugee situations tend to produce radicalized populations that would cause 
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renewed conflict if IDPs and refugees are allowed to return back (Adelman, 1998; Sude et al. 
2015; Lischer 2015). Following the signing of the Dayton Accords, Chaim Kaufmann argued 
that refugee return provisions are undesirable and unenforceable suggesting instead 
compensations for lost property (Kaufmann, 1996:168). Others have emphasized the security 
dimension of the issue and even coined the term “refugee warriors” (Zolberg et. al. 1986) 
introducing a language that explicitly use security concerns to limit IDP and refugee rights. 
Adelman and Barkan are probably the strongest proponents of the ‘irreversibility thesis; they 
specifically argue that “the ideology and commitment to return, conveys the notion of 
repatriation as a distant, impractical solution in the face of real desperation’ (Adelman and 
Barkan 2011: xvii).  Amongst those the general assumption is that forced displacements are 
irreversible once new demographic facts are established on the ground (e.g., Kaufmann 1996; 
Adelman & Barkan 2011).  
This book challenges the irreversibility thesis in three different ways. First, our 
database of peace processes and durable returns demonstrates how in comprehensive peace 
settlements, IDPs and refugees are supported through various mechanisms. The rates of 
return among IDPs and refugees in 25 comprehensive settlements we examined using the 
Peace Accords matrix of the Kroc Institute suggest a range of outcomes from almost full 
return (e.g. El Salvador) to ten percent return (Angola); the remaining cases lie within this 
range. Secondly, our own survey data do not support claims that IDPs and refugees tend to be 
more radicalized (Psaltis et al. forthcoming); in our Cyprus survey, IDPs were even more 
likely to support a future settlement than non-IDPs while in Bosnia returnees were more open 
to reconciliation (Hall et.al 2018). Finally, our Cyprus data suggest replacing the 
irreversibility with the Goldilocks zone thesis. We argue that return under Turkish Cypriot 
administration is expected to happen in significant numbers for Greek Cypriots to make 
reunification meaningful but is not expected to exceed more than a quarter of the affected 
IDP population. Greek Cypriot IDP return will not create ‘practical difficulties’ for Turkish 
Cypriots as those are implied for instance in the High-Level agreement, however, to be 
absolutely confident and to convince the leaderships of both sides we propose a non-binding 
census of all IDPs and their preferences ahead of any further discussion on the issue.   
 This latter point suggests that pragmatism needs to be combined with legal principles 
(or their absence) to address comparable situations. The pragmatic approach to problems 
facing post-conflict societies looks on how people reconstruct their lives and prioritizes 
restorative justice and community rebuilding. It looks at a wider range of factors including 
the need for victim-offender mediations (Zehr & Mika, 1998), mutually agreed compromises, 
the passage of time, local power dynamics, and the rights of non-indigenous groups/settlers 
or their descendants (Carens, 2000: 217). International mediators have often been exposed to 
the challenges of IDP and refugee return across divided and post-conflict societies therefore 
comparative expertise and precedents matter. As noted above, it is unlikely to see freely 
negotiated peace settlements not respecting the right of return in the future (with the 
exclusion of cases from WWII and before); even in the absence of the legal framework a 
norm is emerging particularly among the largely IDP and refugee nations (e.g. the 
Palestinians, Cypriots, the Rohingyas).   
Yet in the absence of legal frameworks, not only intentions but also precedents are 
important. Drawing on another experience from Rwanda, a member of De Soto’s team in 
Cyprus during the Annan Plan talks, Lisa Jones pointed out that fundamental rights of the 
affected population should be carefully balanced with security concerns and comments 
positively on post-genocide, community-based arrangements to share land among returnees 
and new owners, thus avoiding the prospect of renewed-violence (Jones, 2003: 223 & 217). 
Jones’s argumentation reflects the fusion of alternative orientations in the literature and 
practice of conflict resolution: as noted earlier Human rights/Legalism is based on the 
applicability of universal norms and high standards of retributive justice while pragmatism, 
which relies on adaptation to local conditions and political expediency (Leckie, 2003:25; 
Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003; Vinjamuri and Snyder, 2004).  
While the book endorses this understanding of pragmatism it makes two 
qualifications: first, short term political expediency should not limit or endanger the search 
towards universal human rights standards (if there is to be a marriage between the two the 
dominant partner should be the former) and secondly not all pragmatic approaches have equal 
effects. For example, the book critiques both the UN and ECHR approaches on IDPs 
providing a new framework combining novel institutional formulas, social capital and survey 
technologies. 
With regards to surveys, the book revisits the idea of a census of all IDPs and current 
users aiming to identify the zone of possible agreement through amicable compromises. So 
far, conventional wisdom assumed a trilemma on the Cyprus problem. If Greek Cypriot had 
the right to choose first on the fate of their properties, Turkish Cypriot users will be 
disappointed. If Turkish Cypriot users get the first say, Greek Cypriots will find such an 
arrangement unacceptable. If the situation stays as it is both communities lose because of lack 
of clarity as to rights while efforts by the UN to identify criteria for restitution or 
compensation have been extremely time-consuming and caused uproar on both communities. 
The census idea resolves this trilemma particularly if sufficient number of IDPs are already 
certain as to how to allocate their properties (as also shown our surveys). If a proportion of 
Greek Cypriots is certain as to non-return then their decisions (assuming sufficient 
compensations) secures Turkish Cypriot majority private ownership and population. If a 
portion of Greek Cypriots aspires to immediate return even under Turkish Cypriot 
administration, then their return becomes easier once the former have been secured a key 
concession related to their understanding of bizonality. This arrangement does not leave 
undecided respondents out of the picture though; better arrangements for them become easier 
by minimizing the overall cases for property commissions and by removing the bizonality 
constraints once a certain percentage of IDPs opt for compensations. Besides the census, 
online apps could be developed for respondents to change their mind (until they are asked to 
sign) thus potentially minimizing undecided respondents and offering all affected individuals 
equal chances and the opportunity to re-adjust their views during public deliberations for the 
settlement.   
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